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Partial exclusivity can resolve the empirical puzzles associated with rent-seeking activities
Leppälä, Samuli - 2018
.S. state-level lobbying expenditures, which reveals another puzzle regarding the constant relationship between aggregate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011961962
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Rent-seeking contests under symmetric and asymmetric information
Wasser, Cédric - 2010
We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950459
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Ability Grouping in Contests
Xiao, Jun - 2016
This paper considers a situation in which participants with heterogeneous ability types are grouped into different competitions for performance ranking. In a contest, there may be performance spillovers, because of which a participant can benefit from others' performance. A planner can allocate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013005052
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Ability Grouping in Contests
Xiao, Jun - 2022
This paper considers a situation in which students with heterogeneous ability types are grouped into different competitions for performance ranking. A planner can group the students and design prize structure in each competition in order to maximize the weighted total performance subject to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013307504
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Lobbying of firms by voters
Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2009
A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378822
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Group specific public goods, orchestration of interest groups and free riding
Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef - 2009
We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good where each member of a group has a different benefit from the good. Our model can be interpreted in two ways: Each of the players has a non-linear investment cost in the contest, or alternatively, the returns to effort are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003817303
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Exclusivity of Groups in Contests
Send, Jonas - 2021
I analyse a group contest in which groups decide over two dimensions of membership-exclusivity: whether a member is allowed to join the group at all, and whether this member is allowed to join another group as well. If the prize is mostly private, group leaders do not offer membership in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013323852
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The Effect of the Number of Size of Interest Groups on Social Rent Dissipation
Sun, Guang-Zhen; Ng, Yew-Kwang - 2008
groups. The first model analyzes the case in which individuals in each group ignore the effect of the lobbying effect on the … model examine the case wherein the individual in each group takes account of the effect of lobbying activities on the Big …-size" effect in lobbying; when the group number is big, the Big Pie effect is insignificant and therefore is dominated by the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014170948
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Lobbying of Firms by Voters
Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - 2009
A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014205871
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Private-Information Group Contests
Barbieri, Stefano; Malueg, David A. - 2015
We model competing groups when players' values for winning are private information, each group's performance equals the best effort ("best shot") of its members, and the group with the best performance wins the contest. At the symmetric equilibrium of symmetric contests, increasing the number of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014142038