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Consider a two-product firm that decides on the quality of each product. Product quality is unknown to consumers. If the firm sells both products under the same brand name, consumers adjust their beliefs about quality subject to the performance of both products. We show that if the probability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365881
convince consumers of the high quality of its products. Alternatively, a firm can rely on external certification of the quality … external certification. We also show that the potential to signal quality is improved if consumers condition their beliefs on … the source of information, namely whether information comes from external certification or from random detection …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012724659
Consider a two-product firm that decides on the quality of each product. Product quality is unknown to consumers. If the firm sells both products under the same brand name, consumers adjust their beliefs about quality subject to the performance of both products. We show that if the probability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318794
In markets for credence goods sellers are better informed than their customers about the quality that yields the highest surplus from trade. This paper studies second-degree price-discrimination in such markets. It shows that discrimination regards the amount of advice offered to customers and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010354736
I study optimal information provision by a search goods seller. While the seller controls a consumer's pre-search information, which decides whether she will engage in costly search for the product, he cannot control her post-search information because the consumer would inevitably learn the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013244049
This paper examines how delivery tariffs and private quality standards are determined in vertical relations that are subject to asymmetric information. We consider an infinitely repeated game where an upstream firm sells a product to a downstream firm. In each period, the firms negotiate a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003930890
This paper examines how delivery tariffs and private quality standards are determined in vertical relations that are subject to asymmetric information. We consider an infinitely repeated game where an upstream firm sells a product to a downstream firm. In each period, the firms negotiate a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009008680
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720706
This paper examines how delivery tariffs and private quality standards are determined in vertical relations that are subject to asymmetric information. We consider an infinitely repeated game where an upstream firm sells a product to a downstream firm. In each period, the firms negotiate a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013144459
I compare certification and self-regulation, two widely used quality assurance mechanisms in markets where consumers do … not observe the quality of goods. Certification is a mechanism in which an external firm offers a certificate to producers … certification fee. Self-regulation is a mechanism in which a club of firms in the industry adhere (or not) to a self-imposed code of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014203148