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Informational opacity and honest certification

Pollrich, Martin; Wagner, Lilo - 2014

This paper studies the interaction of information disclosure and reputational concerns in certification markets. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010408008

Umbrella branding and the provision of quality

Hakenes, Hendrik; Peitz, Martin - 2006

Consider a two-product firm that decides on the quality of each product. Product quality is unknown to consumers. If the firm sells both products under the same brand name, consumers adjust their beliefs about quality subject to the performance of both products. We show that if the probability...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365881

Umbrella Branding and External Certification

Hakenes, Hendrik - 2008

convince consumers of the high quality of its products. Alternatively, a firm can rely on external certification of the quality … external certification. We also show that the potential to signal quality is improved if consumers condition their beliefs on … the source of information, namely whether information comes from external certification or from random detection …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012724659

Too much or too little? : price-discrimination in a market for credence goods

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Konovalov, Alexander … - 2014

In markets for credence goods sellers are better informed than their customers about the quality that yields the highest surplus from trade. This paper studies second-degree price-discrimination in such markets. It shows that discrimination regards the amount of advice offered to customers and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010354736

Halal certification for financial products : a transaction cost perspective

Hayat, Raphie; Butter, Frank A. G. den; Kock, Udo - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720706

Quality distortions in vertical relations

Baake, Pio; Schlippenbach, Vanessa von - 2011

This paper examines how delivery tariffs and private quality standards are determined in vertical relations that are subject to asymmetric information. We consider an infinitely repeated game where an upstream firm sells a product to a downstream firm. In each period, the firms negotiate a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009008680

Quality distortions in vertical relations

Baake, Pio; Schlippenbach, Vanessa von - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003930890

Informational Opacity and Honest Certification

Pollrich, Martin; Wagner, Lilo - 2013

This paper studies the interaction of information disclosure and reputational concerns in certification markets. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014158720

Mandatory vs. Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers

Fishman, Michael J.; Hagerty, Kathleen M. - 1997

Numerous rules mandate the disclosure of information. This article analyzes why such rules are enacted. Specifically, 1) why wouldn't firms voluntarily disclose their private information; and 2) given that voluntary disclosure would not be forthcoming, who has the incentive to lobby for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014101521

Comparing Certification and Self-Regulation

Mysliveček, Jan - 2009

I compare certification and self-regulation, two widely used quality assurance mechanisms in markets where consumers do … not observe the quality of goods. Certification is a mechanism in which an external firm offers a certificate to producers … certification fee. Self-regulation is a mechanism in which a club of firms in the industry adhere (or not) to a self-imposed code of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014203148

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