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Ordinal cheap talk in common value auctions

Chakraborty, Archishman (contributor); … - 2002 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Sellers benefit on average from revealing information about their goods to buyers, but the incentive to exaggerate undermines the credibility of seller statements. When multiple goods are being auctioned, we show that ordinal cheap talk, which reveals a complete or partial ordering of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001769030

Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design

Bergemann, Dirk; Välimäki, Juuso - 2001

We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire covert information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists which provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex-ante and implements the efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014165690

Signaling in auctions among competitors

Scarpatetti, Benedikt von; Wasser, Cédric - 2010

of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to all firms … bidders' costs generally depends on the type and fierceness of the market competition, the specific auction format, and the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935653

Innovation contests with entry auction

Giebe, Thomas - 2010

effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for …-price auction. We characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria such that both mechanisms are payoff-equivalent and induce the same efforts … and innovations. In these equilibria, signaling in the entry auction does not occur since contestants play a simple …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935696

Appraising the 'Merger Price' Appraisal Rule

Choi, Albert H. - 2018

This paper develops an auction design framework to analyze various methods for assessing “fair value” in post …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012935039

Past Performance Evaluation in Repeated Procurement : A Simple Model of Handicapping

Cesi, Berardino - 2008

When procurement contracts are awarded through competitive tendering participating firms commit ex ante to fulfil a set of contractual duties. However, selected contractors may find profitable to renege ex post on their promises by opportunistically delivering lower quality standards. In order...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012725083

Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design

Bergemann, Dirk; Välimäki, Juuso - 2001

We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists which provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex-ante and implements the efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014130155

Resource Allocation with Positive Externalities

Bhaskar, Dhruva - 2020

In many allocation problems, transfers are unavailable, but incentives are partially aligned due to positive externalities. We study how a designer can exploit this alignment to allocate a resource between n agents. We identify a natural mechanism that partitions types into intervals and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012855071

Turning Up the Heat : The Discouraging Effect of Competition in Contests

Fang, Dawei - 2019

We study contests in which contestants are homogeneous and have convex effort costs. Increasing contest competitiveness, by making prizes more unequal, scaling up the competition, or adding new contestants, always discourages effort. These results have significant implications: although often...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012900543

Should We Tax or Cap Contributions? : A Lobbying Model with Policy Favors and Access

Cotton, Christopher - 2013

This paper develops a model of political contributions in which a politician can either sell policy favors, or sell access. Access allows interest groups to share hard information with the politician in support of their preferred policy. Here selling access maximizes policy utility, while...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013095917