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of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to all firms … bidders' costs generally depends on the type and fierceness of the market competition, the specific auction format, and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935653
effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for …-price auction. We characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria such that both mechanisms are payoff-equivalent and induce the same efforts … and innovations. In these equilibria, signaling in the entry auction does not occur since contestants play a simple …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935696
Sellers benefit on average from revealing information about their goods to buyers, but the incentive to exaggerate undermines the credibility of seller statements. When multiple goods are being auctioned, we show that ordinal cheap talk, which reveals a complete or partial ordering of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001769030
This paper develops an auction design framework to analyze various methods for assessing “fair value” in post …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012935039
We study contests in which contestants are homogeneous and have convex effort costs. Increasing contest competitiveness, by making prizes more unequal, scaling up the competition, or adding new contestants, always discourages effort. These results have significant implications: although often...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012900543
In many allocation problems, transfers are unavailable, but incentives are partially aligned due to positive externalities. We study how a designer can exploit this alignment to allocate a resource between n agents. We identify a natural mechanism that partitions types into intervals and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012855071
In this paper, we investigate how information revelation rules affect the existence and the efficiency of equilibria in two-round elimination contests. We establish that there exists no symmetric separating equilibrium under the full revelation rule and find that the non-existence result is very...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012989369
This paper develops a model of political contributions in which a politician can either sell policy favors, or sell access. Access allows interest groups to share hard information with the politician in support of their preferred policy. Here selling access maximizes policy utility, while...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013095917
In most wholesale electricity markets generators must submit step-function offers of supply to a uniform price auction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003809097
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003896781