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Parliamentary procedure : principal forms and political effects

Schwartz, Thomas - In: Public choice 136 (2008) 3/4, pp. 353-377

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003746524

From arrow to cycles, instability, and chaos by untying alternatives

Schwartz, Thomas - In: Social choice and welfare 18 (2001) 1, pp. 1-22

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001553586

Representation as agency and the Pork Barrel Paradox

Schwartz, Thomas - In: Public choice 78 (1994) 1, pp. 3-21

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001157199

Parties

Schwartz, Thomas - In: Constitutional political economy 32 (2021) 4, pp. 462-475

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012651356

Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs : Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized

Duggan, John; Schwartz, Thomas - In: Social choice and welfare 17 (2000) 1, pp. 85-93

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001436661

Interbranch cooperation and the shadow of the future

Baker, Travis J.; Schwartz, Thomas - In: Constitutional political economy 27 (2016) 3, pp. 319-331

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011776358

The executive veto : purpose, procedure, and paradox

Schwartz, Thomas - In: Constitutional political economy 10 (1999) 1, pp. 89-105

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001378060

The Logic of Collective Choice

Schwartz, Thomas - 1986

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Foreword -- Preface -- Introduction -- Part I. The Formal Representation of Choice Processes -- Chapter 1. Choice Functions -- Chapter 2. Individual Participation -- Part II. Collective Choice and Collective Rationality -- Chapter 3. Voting Paradoxes -- Chapter 4....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014488845

[Rezension von: Schwartz, Thomas, The logic of collective choice]

Bonner, John - In: The economic journal : the journal of the Royal … 97 (1987), pp. 517-518

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001342528

Strategic Manipulability Without Resoluteness or Shared Beliefs : Gibbard-Satterthwaite Generalized

Duggan, John; Schwartz, Thomas - 2007

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of social-choice rules assumes resoluteness: there are no ties, no multi-member choice sets. Generalizations based on a familiar lottery idea allow ties but assume perfectly shared probabilistic beliefs about their resolution. We prove a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014175852