We develop a dynamic model of corporate investment and financing decisions in which corporate insiders have superior information about the firm's growth prospects. We show that firms with positive private information can credibly signal their type to outside investors using the timing of...

We use a dynamic model of cash management in which firms face competitive pressure to show that competition increases corporate cash holdings as well as the frequency and size of equity issues. In our model, these effects are driven by small, financially constrained firms, in contrast with the...

Bedingte Aktiengeschäfte sind solche, die nur bei Eintritt einer Bedingung wirksam werden, z. B. bei einer Übernahme oder der Wahl eines bestimmten Vorstandsvorsitzenden. Damit lassen sich Alternativen bewerten und Entscheidungen besser treffen.

This paper explores the implications of systemic risk in Credit Structured Finance (CSF). Risk measurement issues loomed large during the 2007-08 financial crisis, as the massive, unprecedented number of downgrades of AAA senior bond tranches inflicted severe losses on banks, calling into...

This paper explores the implications of systemic risk in Credit Structured Finance (CSF). Risk measurement issues loomed large during the 2007-08 financial crisis, as the massive, unprecedented number of downgrades of AAA senior bond tranches inflicted severe losses on banks, calling into...

Rumors can be classified into two types, according to whether they can credibly predict impending events or not. The analysis of takeover rumors of publically traded US companies from 1990 to 2008 shows that these two types of rumors can be statistically distinguished by returns of rumored...

Managers whose equity-based incentives vest over a shorter time horizon appear to adopt strategies that reduce information environment quality and exacerbate information heterogeneity across investors. Firms with shorter-horizon managerial incentives are more likely to inflate reported earnings...

This paper examines the relationship between asymmetric information and target returns in M&As. We argue that if managers possess favorable (unfavorable) asymmetric information, they will offer, ceteris paribus, high (low) premia, affecting target returns accordingly. We propose several proxies...