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In markets for credence goods sellers are better informed than their customers about the quality that yields the highest surplus from trade. This paper studies second-degree price-discrimination in such markets. It shows that discrimination regards the amount of advice offered to customers and...
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Markets for expert services are characterized by information asymmetries between experts and consumers. We analyze the … effects of consumer information, where consumers suffer from either a minor or serious problem and only experts can infer the … endorsed by good signals and fundamentally changed by bad signals. Experts condition their cheating on a consumer's risk of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011496820
We experimentally examine the impact of tax evasion attempts on the performance of credence goods markets, where contractual incompleteness results from asymmetric information on the welfare maximizing quality of the good. Our results suggest that tax evasion attempts - independently of whether...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010529409
In markets where transactions are governed by contractual incompleteness, revealed intentions to evade taxes may affect market performance. We experimentally examine the impact of tax evasion attempts on the performance of credence goods markets, where contractual incompleteness results from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010237657
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumerś problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010429934
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer's problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010436207
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer's problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010436518
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011607827
We investigate a market in which experts have a moral hazard problem because they need to invest in costly but … unobservable effort to identify consumer problems. Experts have either high or low qualification and can invest either high or low … effort in their diagnosis. High skilled experts are able to identify problems with some probability even with low effort …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011687778