We consider a many-to-many matching problem with a priority structure such as the one in undergraduate course allocation. In order to incorporate course priorities, we develop a deterministic pseudo-market mechanism with priority-specific prices that is based on the approximate competitive...

The European electricity market design is based on zonal markets with uniform prices. Locational price signals within these zones - necessary to ensure long-term efficiency - are not provided. Specifically, if intra-zonal congestion occurs due to missing grid expansion, the market design is...

Analyzing price data from sequential German electricity markets, namely the day-ahead and intraday auction, a puzzling but apparently systematic pattern of price premiums can be identified. The price premiums are highly correlated with the underlying demand profile. As there is evidence that...

We reexamine the existence of stable solutions in a class of three-sided matching problems previously studied by Zhang and Zhong (2021). The sets of participants are U, V, and W. Agents in U have strict preferences defined on V, agents in V have strict preferences defined on W, and agents in W...

We analyze the k-ticket lottery, which is used to allocate hunting permits in the state of Alaska. Each participant is given k tickets to distribute among lotteries for different types of items. Participants who win multiple items receive their favorite, and new winners are drawn from the...

Interdistrict school choice programs-where a student can be assigned to a school outside of her district-are widespread in the US, yet the market-design literature has not considered such programs. We introduce a model of interdistrict school choice and present two mechanisms that produce stable...

School choice programs aim to give students the option to choose their school. At the same time, underrepresented minority students should be favored to close the opportunity gap. A common way to achieve this is to have a majority quota at each school, and to require that no school be assigned...