Decentralized matching markets on the internet allow large numbers of agents to interact anonymously at virtually no … sell-side). This simple and intuitive learning process implements core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of …

buy (sell) a single unit of an indivisible good. The core predicts a unique and extreme outcome: the entire surplus is … split evenly among the buyers when m gt; n and among the sellers when m lt; n; the long side gets nothing. We test this core … deviations from the core prediction, we find that successful collusion is infrequent in both new institutions. A disproportionate …

. The core predicts a unique and extreme outcome: the entire surplus is split evenly among the buyers when m > n and among … the sellers when m < n; the long side gets nothing. We test this core conjecture in the lab with n + m = 3 or 5 randomly … agreements while trading. Despite frequent attempts to collude and occasional large deviations from the core prediction, we find …

One-sided assignment problems combine important features of two well-known matching models. First, as in roommate … problems, any two agents can be matched and second, as in two-sided assignment problems, the payoffs of a matching can be … with a non-empty core), if a subsolution of the core satisfies [indifference with respect to dummy agents, continuity, and …

Decentralized matching markets on the internet allow large numbers of agents to interact anonymously at virtually no … sell-side). This simple and intuitive learning process implements core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of …

(weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the …-partner matching problem that includes two-sided matching problems as special cases. Under the same preference restriction, we also …