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Information updating and insurance dropout : evidence from dental insurance
Grönqvist, Erik (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]
. -- Asymmetric Information ; Adverse Selection ; Learning ; Health Insurance …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002570047
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(M)oral hazard?
Grönqvist, Erik (contributor) - 2006
Would you go to the dentist more often if it were free? Observational data is here used to analyze the impact of full-coverage insurance on dental care utilization using different identification strategies. The challenge of assessing the bite of moral hazard without an experimental study design...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003393203
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Does adverse selection matter? : Evidence from a natural experiment
Grönqvist, Erik (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]
The empirical evidence of adverse selection in insurance markets is mixed. The problem in assessing the extent of adverse selection is that private information, on which agents act, is generally unobservable to the researcher, which makes it difficult to distinguish between adverse selection and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002570039
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Tax policy and entrepreneurial entry with information asymmetry and learning
D'Andria, Diego - 2017 - This version: February 2017
subsidy to labour and a simultaneous tax on entrepreneurs to curb excessive entry, with learning a subsidy-only policy can be …-increasing faster learning. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011982041
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Learning by Owning in a Lemons Market
Martel, Jordan - 2019
We study market dynamics when an owner learns over time about the quality of her asset. Since this information is private, the owner sells strategically to a less informed buyer following sufficient negative information. In response, market prices feature a "U-shape" relative to the length of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012903225
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Information updating and insurance dropout : evidence from dental insurance
Grönqvist, Erik - In: Competitive failures in insurance markets : theory and …, (pp. 135-156). 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003388532
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Minimum coverage regulation in insurance markets
McFadden, Daniel; Noton Norambuena, Carlos; Olivella, Pau - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 6 (2015) 3, pp. 247-278
We study the consequences of imposing a minimum coverage in an insurance market where enrollment is mandatory and agents have private information on their true risk type. If the regulation is not too stringent, the equilibrium is separating in which a single insurer monopolizes the high risks...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011311740
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Learning from Lemons : The Role of Government in Index Insurance for Individuals
Clarke, Daniel - 2015
This paper considers the potential role of government in aiding the scale-up of high quality index insurance products in developing countries. In particular, we analyse optimal public policy in light of the fact that index insurance policies are typically credence goods - that is, the basis risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013015662
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Endogenizing private information : incentive contracts under learning by doing
Gärtner, Dennis (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]
technologies display learning effects and agents’ rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full … commitment available to the principal, we show that whether learning effects are over- or under-exploited crucially depends on … whether learning effects increase or decrease the principal’s uncertainty about agents’ costs of production. Hence, what …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002521609
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Insurance in a market for credence goods
Sülzle, Kai; Wambach, Achim - 2002
We study the impact of insurance on the amount of fraud in a physician-patient relationship. In a market for credence goods, where prices are regulated by an authority, physicians act as experts. Due to their informational advantage, physicians have an incentive to cheat by inducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409200