This paper examines whether more informative job promotions carry larger wage increases. In job assignment models with asymmetric information, unexpected promotions send a signal to the external labor market to revise upward their assessment of a worker's ability. The employing firm must then...

In this paper, I analyse the relationship between job-related training and career progress of workers. Most theories of career paths and task assignment rely on human capital accumulation. Therefore, it seems natural to start assessing the empirical validity of such theories by analysing the...

A previous literature cautions that paying workers for performance might crowd out non-monetary motives to work hard. Empirical evidence from the field, however, has been based on between-subjects designs that are best suited for detecting crowding out due to low-powered incentives. High-powered...

Much attention has been devoted to studying models of tournaments or situations in which an individual's payment depends only on his output or rank, relative to other competitors. Such models are of more than academic Interest as they may well describe the compensation structures applicable to...

A previous literature cautions that paying workers for performance might crowd out non-monetary motives to work hard. Empirical evidence from the field, however, has been based on between-subjects designs that are best suited for detecting crowding out due to low-powered incentives. High-powered...

Much attention has been devoted to studying models of tournaments or situations in which an individual's payment depends only on his output or rank, relative to other competitors. Such models are of more than academic Interest as they may well describe the compensation structures applicable to...