Certificates are widely used as a signaling mechanism to mitigate adverse selection when information is asymmetric. To reduce information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers, Chinese peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms encourage borrowers to obtain various kinds of credit certificates. As...

We propose a parsimonious model with adverse selection where delinquency, renegotiation, and bankruptcy all occur in equilibrium as a result of a simple screening mechanism. A borrower has private information about her cost of bankruptcy, and a lender may use random contracts to screen different...

This paper explains how unobserved borrower risk factors and changing economic expectations can interact to create vintage effects and parameter instability in mortgage credit risk models. We develop a model of mortgage choice and default behavior that demonstrates how this could have led to...

Certificates are widely used as a signaling mechanism to mitigate adverse selection when information is asymmetric. To reduce information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers, Chinese peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms encourage borrowers to obtain various kinds of credit certificates. As...

Using a theoretical model that assumes heterogeneity in lenders' screening ability and in borrowers' investment horizon, we show that fintech loans to entrepreneurs are more likely to be unsecured and short-term while bank loans are expected to be asset-backed and long-term. The findings suggest...