We propose a price-cap mechanism for electricity-transmission expansion based on redefining transmission output in terms of financial transmission rights. Our mechanism applies the incentive-regulation logic of rebalancing a two-part tariff. First, we test this mechanism in a three-node network....

Electricity transmission has become the pivotal industry segment for electricity restructuring. Yet, little is known about the shape of transmission cost functions. Reasons for this can be a lack of consensus about the definition of transmission output and the complexitity of the relationship...

This paper proposes an incentive mechanism for transmission expansion planning. The mechanism is a bilevel program. The upper level is a profit-maximizing transmission company (Transco) which expands its transmission system while endogenously predicts and influences the generation investment....

We analyze the treatment and impact of idiosyncratic or firm-specific risk in regulation. Regulatory authorities regularly ignore firm-specific characteristics, such as size or asset ages, implying different risk exposure in incentive regulation. In contrast, it is common to apply only a single...

Electricity transmission pricing and transmission grid expansion have received increasing regulatory and analytical attention in recent years. Since electricity transmission is a very special service with unusual characteristics, such as loop flows, the approaches have been largely tailor-made...

The purpose of this article is to analyze the security of supply in Colombia. The analysis considers the Reliability Charge, which is a model adapted in Colombia to guarantee generation investments. We measure the difference among demand supply electricity scenarios. The supply side for new...

The capacity of the transmission network determines the extent of integration of a multi-national energy market. Cross-border externalities render coordination of network capacity valuable. Is it then optimal to collect powers in the hands of a single regulator? Should a common system operator...

This paper examines the Hogan-Roselloacute;n-Vogelsang (2007) (HRV) incentive mechanism for transmission expansion, and tests it for different network topologies. This new mechanism is based upon redefining transmission output in terms of point-to-point transactions or financial transmission...