This paper discusses how local tax rates of the business tax are set when communities compete for capital as a mobile factor. In a theoretical model communities provide public inputs financed by a tax on capital income in order to maximize a general objective function, which includes residents'...

In a theoretical model local jurisdictions provide a public input an d a public consumption good financed by a tax on capital income. When deciding about tax rate and budget structure the jurisdictions will generally respond to each others fiscal choices irrespective of whether the policy is...

This paper examines efficiency in the provision and utilization of a congestible public input in a symmetric tax competition framework with wage rigidities. Despite the fact that also lump-sum taxation is available for regional governments, second-best efficiency emerges only as a special case...

We here expand the static tax competition models in symmetric small regions, which were indicated by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986), to a dynamic tax competition model in large regions, taking consideration of the regional asymmetry of productivity of public capital and the...