Arguably the fundamental problem faced by employers is how to elicit effort from employees. Most models suggest that employers meet this challenge by monitoring employees carefully to prevent shirking. But there is another option that relies on heterogeneity across employees, and that is to...

Delegation in hiring (DIH) is becoming a mainstream management practice among business chains worldwide, yet theoretical and empirical evidence of its effects remains scarce. DIH refers to the use of store managers to do their own recruiting, rather than relying on the headquarters human...

Non-market organizations always rely on authority, instead of negotiation and exchange, to allocate resources. However, as Arrow (1974) stressed, "Disobedience to orders, organized or unorganized, frequently sets limits to authority." In this paper, we develop a fairness-based obedience theory...

As knowledge production becomes more specialized, studying complex and multi-faceted empirical realities becomes more difficult. This has created a growing need for cross-fertilization and collaboration between research disciplines. According to prior studies, the sharing of concepts, ideas and...

We argue that corporate investment decisions depend not only on project characteristics such as expected NPV, but also on how well a firm can assess its managers' human capital. If so, projects pitched by managers about whom the firm has more complete information should be more likely to be...

This paper investigates the effects of managerial incentives on favoritism in promotion decisions. First, we theoretically show that favoritism leads to a lower quality of promotion decisions and in turn lower efforts. But the effect can be mitigated by pay-for-performance incentives for...

Projects are embedded in multiple systemic contexts, e.g. organizations, interorganizational networks and organizational fields, which jointly facilitate and constrain project organizing. As projects partly evolve in idiosyncratic ways as temporary systems, embedding needs to be understood as a...

Traditionally, researchers have had difficulty testing the relationship between the degree of risk or uncertainty in workers' environments and incentive pay. The authors employ Prendergast's (2002) theory that incorporates the delegation of worker authority into the principal-agent model to...

We analyze the effects of lower bounds on wages on optimal job design within firms. In our model, two tasks affect firm value and an imperfect performance measure. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is efficient. Yet a sufficiently large wage floor...