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This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003324054
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377049
This paper investigates the effects of managerial incentives on favoritism in promotion decisions. First, we theoretically show that favoritism leads to a lower quality of promotion decisions and in turn lower efforts. But the effect can be mitigated by pay-for-performance incentives for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009232290
As knowledge production becomes more specialized, studying complex and multi-faceted empirical realities becomes more difficult. This has created a growing need for cross-fertilization and collaboration between research disciplines. According to prior studies, the sharing of concepts, ideas and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012926219
This paper discusses about job and labor from the perspective of macroeconomics and politics using short essays and examples. It is often the case that jobs and labor events are in conflict with an intuition which is led from labor economics based on microeconomics theory. These discrepancies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012841730
Non-market organizations always rely on authority, instead of negotiation and exchange, to allocate resources. However, as Arrow (1974) stressed, "Disobedience to orders, organized or unorganized, frequently sets limits to authority." In this paper, we develop a fairness-based obedience theory...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012909030
We argue that corporate investment decisions depend not only on project characteristics such as expected NPV, but also on how well a firm can assess its managers' human capital. If so, projects pitched by managers about whom the firm has more complete information should be more likely to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013052261
Firms allocate workers to clients to provide services. On the job, workers acquire skills that increase their client-specific productivity and therefore raise the probability that clients poach them. In this paper, we advance the understanding of this important, yet understudied feature of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013241648
We analyze the effects of lower bounds on wages, e.g., minimum wages or liability limits, on job design within firms. In our model, two tasks contribute to non-veriable firm value and affect an imperfect performance measure. The tasks can be assigned to either one or two agents. In the absence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009125582
Delegation in hiring (DIH) is becoming a mainstream management practice among business chains worldwide, yet theoretical and empirical evidence of its effects remains scarce. DIH refers to the use of store managers to do their own recruiting, rather than relying on the headquarters human...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012846314