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Wealth constraints and option contracts in models with sequential investments

Lülfesmann, Christoph - In: The Rand journal of economics 36 (2005) 4, pp. 753-770

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003323610

Partial monitoring, adverse selection, and the internal efficiency of the firm

Lülfesmann, Christoph - In: International journal of industrial organization 20 (2002) 8, pp. 1097-1118

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001703624

Central governance or subsidiarity : a property-rights approach to federalism

Lülfesmann, Christoph - In: European economic review : EER 46 (2002) 8, pp. 1379-1397

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001705051

Incomplete contracts. : Non-contractible quality, and renegotiation

Lülfesmann, Christoph (contributor) - In: Contributions to theoretical economics 1 (2001) 1

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001707951

Benevolent government, managerial incentives, and the virtues of privatization

Lülfesmann, Christoph - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001710388

Start-up firms, venture capital financing, and renegotiation

Lülfesmann, Christoph - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001444202

When should we privatize? : An incomplete-contracts approach

Lülfesmann, Christoph - In: Journal of financial management and analysis : … 11 (1998) 1, pp. 20-31

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001255397

When should we privatize? : an incomplete-contracts approach

Lülfesmann, Christoph - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000993125

Start-up firms, venture capital financing and renegotiation

Lülfesmann, Christoph - In: Journal of financial management and analysis : … 13 (2000) 1, pp. 1-15

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001560808

Benevolent government, managerial incentives, and the virtues of privatization

Lülfesmann, Christoph - 2002

We show that privatization can be beneficial even if the government is rational and benevolent, and if the firm's economic and informational environment is independent of the governance structure. The model assumes that wage contracts between the firm's owner (government or private entrepreneur)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011597691