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Perotti, Enrico; Volpin, Paolo - 2004

We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In-cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potentialentrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011338011

The political economy of financial fragility

Feijen, Erik; Perotti, Enrico - 2005

followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even … by more leveraged entrepreneurs, protecting more established producers. As a result, lobbying may deliberately worsen …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348359

The political economy of financial systems

Haber, Stephen H.; Perotti, Enrico - 2008

This survey reviews the literature on the political economy of financial structure, broadly defined to include the size of capital markets and banking systems as well as the distribution of access to external finance across firms.The theoretical literature on the institutional basis for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374399

Investor protection and entry

Perotti, Enrico; Volpin, Paolo - 2006

Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits competition. We model how incumbents lobby harder to block access to finance to entrants when politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350369

Investor Protection, Regulation and Bank Risk-Taking Behavior

Teixeira, João C. A. - 2020

This paper examines whether the influence of investor protection on banks' risk is channeled through banking regulation, and vice-versa, using panel data from a sample of 567 European and US banks for the 2004–2015 period. As banking regulatory factors, we consider capital stringency, activity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012839033

Investor Protection and the Role of Firm-Level Financial Transparency in Attracting Foreign Investment

Hansen, Bowe - 2015

We ask if companies can attract foreign equity capital by improving the transparency of their financial statements. Using a large panel of firms across fifty-one countries outside the U.S., we show that the answer is yes, but only in countries with relatively high levels of investor protection....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013028874

Countercyclical capital regulation and bank ownership structure

Trani, Tommaso - 2012

This paper develops a macroeconomic framework where the representative bank is owned by inside and outside owners and copes with capital requirements that vary countercyclically. The issuance of outside equity is characterized getting insights from the literature on corporate governance,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009625646

On banking regulation and lobbying

Gersbach, Hans; Papageorgiou, Stylianos - 2019 - This version: January 2019

equilibrium setting, capital requirements and lobbying contributions are determined as the outcome of bargaining between banks and … politicians. We show that bankers and politicians agree on lobbying contributions and capital regulation that renders banks … capital regulation standards from international agreements eliminate lobbying incentives, yielding an efficient and fair …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011962140

Corporate Governance Structure and Mergers

Brewer, Elijah - 2010

Few transactions have the potential to generate revelations about the market value of corporate assets and liabilities as mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Corporate governance and control mechanisms such as independent directors, independent blockholders, and managerial share ownership are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013138830

Self-Fulfilling Liquidity Dry-Ups

Malherbe, Frederic - 2012

This paper presents a model in which cash holding imposes a negative externality because it worsens future adverse selection in markets for long-term assets, which impairs their role for liquidity provision. Adverse selection worsens when potential sellers of long-term assets hold more cash...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013099217