mechanism that is minimally unstable among efficient assignments when the stability comparison is based on counting the number … stability comparison based on the set of blocking students who are involved in at least one blocking pair, show that the …

Distributional constraints are common features in many real matching markets, such as medical residency matching …, school admissions, and teacher assignment. We develop a general theory of matching mechanisms under distributional … is stable and strategy-proof for the individuals. Our proof exploits a connection between a matching problem under …

requirements at each Army branch in military cadet matching and diversity considerations in school choice, whereby school districts … properties. We expect the use of our mechanisms to improve the performance of matching markets with distributional constraints in …

assignments in terms of their stability by comparing their sets of blocking (student-school) pairs or comparing their sets of … student-optimal stable (DA) assignment which is minimally unstable among efficient assignments when the stability comparison … when the stability comparison is based on comparing the sets of blocking pairs in the cardinal sense, or when it is based …

We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individual preferences …

We study efficient and stable mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individuals …' preferences and priorities are drawn randomly. When agents' preferences are uncorrelated, then both efficiency and stability can …

We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individual preferences …