Distributional constraints are common features in many real matching markets, such as medical residency matching …, school admissions, and teacher assignment. We develop a general theory of matching mechanisms under distributional … is stable and strategy-proof for the individuals. Our proof exploits a connection between a matching problem under …

mechanism that is minimally unstable among efficient assignments when the stability comparison is based on counting the number … stability comparison based on the set of blocking students who are involved in at least one blocking pair, show that the …

requirements at each Army branch in military cadet matching and diversity considerations in school choice, whereby school districts … properties. We expect the use of our mechanisms to improve the performance of matching markets with distributional constraints in …

We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches … matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions … typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in the …

axiom of stability (partial stability) allows only certain priority violations. We introduce a class of algorithms called … the Student Exchange under Partial Fairness (SEPF). Each member of this class gives a partially stable matching that is … not Pareto dominated by another partially stable matching (i.e. constrained efficient in the class of partially stable …