We explore Lithuanian credit register data and two bank closures to provide a novel estimate of firms' bank-switching costs and a novel identification of the hold-up problem. We show that when a distressed bank's closure forced firms to switch, these firms started borrowing at lower interest...

We provide a rationale for bank money creation in our current monetary system by investigating its merits over a system with banks as intermediaries of loanable funds. The latter system could result when CBDCs are introduced. In the loanable funds system, households limit banks' leverage ratios...

In this paper we show that the equilibrium in the Stiglitz-Weiss model (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) is a two-interest rate equilibrium. For this we use the true return-function for banks shown by Arnold (2005), the assumption of Bertrand competition and make a consideration for a discrete number...

We study an economy where the lack of a simultaneous double coincidence of wants creates the need for a relatively safe asset (money). We show that, even in the absence of asymmetric information or an agency problem, the private provision of liquidity is inefficient. The reason is that liquidity...

I model an innovation game in which firms can choose to be leaders or followers. Internal finance leads to a stalemate in which each firm wants to free-ride on the others' experimentation costs. Therefore, no innovation occurs. When instead firms compete in the capital markets to finance...

We analyze under what conditions credit markets are efficient in providing loans to entrepreneurs who can start a new project after previous failure. An entrepreneur of uncertain talent chooses the riskiness of her project. If banks cannot perfectly observe the risk of previous projects, two...

If an entrepreneur files for bankruptcy under Chapter 7, (i) most of her debt is discharged, and (ii) only her non-exempt assets are liquidated. Entrepreneurs can undo this “insurance” by posting collateral. The opportunity cost of doing so is lower for safer entrepreneurs who face a lower...

The paper presents an adverse selection-based explanation of the fact that some entrepreneurs choose to finance multiple projects together by issuing a single security and other entrepreneurs decide to finance each project separately. We consider the financing problem of an entrepreneur who has...