We study a class of forward looking economic models with heterogeneous agents in a bounded rationality setting. The agents employ the same recursive learning rule to update beliefs but are characterized by different memory parameters. The peculiarity of the learning mechanism is that the...

This paper presents a class of examples where a barter economy develops through agents' optimizing decisions into a monetary economy. A barter economy with m commodities is characterized by m(m-1)/2 commodity pair trading posts for active trade of each good for every other. Monetary equilibrium...

This study derives the monetary structure of transactions, the use of commodity or fiat money, endogenously from transaction costs in a segmented market general equilibrium model. Market segmentation means there are separate budget constraints for each transaction: Budgets balance in each...

The paper examines the role of fiscal and monetary policy on the dynamics of monetary expansion in a macroeconomy. Its microeconomic structure defined by producers with neoclassical production functions, heterogeneous OLG consumers, and a stationary fiscal and monetary policy induces a...

We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts markets the stable correspondence is monotonic and...

We study equilibria of dynamic over-the-counter markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information. Over time, agents are privately informed by bids and o ffers. Investors diff er with respect to information quality, including initial information precision, and also...

We solve for the equilibrium dynamics of information sharing in a large population. Each agent is endowed with signals regarding the likely outcome of a random variable of common concern. Individuals choose the effort with which they search for others from whom they can gather additional...

Suppose that the agents of a matching market contact each other randomly and form new pairs if is in their interest. Does such a process always converge to a stable matching if one exists? If so, how quickly? Are some stable matchings more likely to be obtained by this process than others? In...