How do patient and provider incentives affect the provision of long-term care? Our analysis of 551 thousand nursing home stays yields three main insights. First, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their stays instead of transitioning to community-based care due to limited cost-sharing. Second,...

This research uses the input-oriented Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach to examine the efficiency of the U.S. health insurers. It shows that more insurers are less efficient than the previous sample year; however, the results suggest that the federal health care reform have no significant...

This paper deals with the idea of converting retirement benefit into a life care annuity with graded benefits using a pre-existing public pay-as-you-go pension scheme. Based on accurate biometric data from Australia and the US, the paper shows that using gender-neutral annuity factors to compute...

A tontine provides a mortality driven, age-increasing payout structure through the pooling of mortality. Because a tontine does not entail any guarantees, the payout structure of a tontine is determined by the pooling of individual characteristics of tontinists. Therefore, the surrender decision...

Background: This paper examines the implicit healthy life expectancy (HLE) used for actuarial calculations in some selected biometric data sets from Australia, China, Portugal, Spain and the US. We are interested in checking the demographic and epidemiological coherence of these data sets...

When public long-term care (LTC) insurance is provided by insurers, they typically lack incentives for purchasing cost-effective LTC. Providing insurers with appropriate incentives for efficiency without jeopardizing access for high-risk individuals requires, among other things, an adequate...

Adverse selection in insurance markets may lead some consumers to underinsure or too few consumers to purchase insurance relative to the socially optimal level. I study whether government intervention can mitigate both underinsurance and underenrollment due to adverse selection. I establish...

Risk adjustment is a common policy for mitigating the effects of adverse selection when government regulation limits insurer ability to rate consumers according to their expected risks. I study the social welfare implications of risk adjustment. I first show theoretically that risk adjustment...

To design premium subsidies in a health insurance market it is necessary to estimate consumer demand, cost, and study how different subsidy schemes affect insurers' incentives. I combine data on household-level enrollment and plan-level claims from the Californian Affordable Care Act insurance...

Millions Saved (2016) is a new edition of detailed case studies on the attributable impact of global health programs at scale. As an input to the book, this paper provides an independent assessment of the cost-effectiveness of a selection of the cases using ex post information from impact...