This paper shows that bank competition has an intrinsically ambiguous effect on capital accumulation and economic growth. We further demonstrate that banking market structure can be responsible for the emergence of development traps in economies that would otherwise be characterized by unique...

In this paper we show that bank competition has an intrinsically ambiguous impact on capital accumulation. We further show that it is also responsible for the emergence of development traps in economies that otherwise would be characterized by unique equilibria. These results explain the...

Market manipulation is a poorly understood phenomenon, due in part to legal standards that categorize manipulative behavior as either an act of outright fraud or as the nebulous use of market power to produce an artificial price. In this paper, we consider a third type of behavior that can...

In this paper, we review and explore the strategic mechanisms that deter entry in banking. The literature relies on externality between banks to generate entry deterrence. Typically, the externality generated is caused by differential adverse selection faced by incumbents and entrants. In this...

This paper shows that bank competition has an intrinsically ambiguous effect on capital accumulation and economic growth. We further demonstrate that banking market structure can be responsible for the emergence of development traps in economies that would otherwise be characterized by unique...

I develop a model that quantifies the profitability of trading from limit order data. This method allows for estimation of the effective number of market participants without the need for trader IDs or proprietary datasets. In addition, my framework can evaluate several different questions in...

Describes the behavior of financial markets as functions of the variables 'price return' and 'time' based on the net difference between ask and bid volumes over a unit period, thereby suggesting that at least a negative non-trivial price return extreme exists for a unit period. This admittedly...

Rules designed to regulate capital markets and protect investors often have spillover effects, either negative or positive, on stakeholders other than investors. These stakeholders can include managers, employees, consumers, taxpayers, gatekeepers, vendors, and others. This raises a question as...

In this paper, I develop a model of oligopoly with shareholder voting. Instead of assuming that firms maximize profits, the objective of the firms is decided by majority voting. This implies that portfolio diversification generates tacit collusion. In the limit, when all shareholders are...