Governments purchase everything from airplanes to zucchini. This paper investigates the role of the technological content of government procurement in innovation. We theoretically show that a shift in the composition of public purchases toward high-tech products translates into higher...

This paper provides a new theoretical rationale for public procurement for innovation (PPI), a unique policy encouraging public procurers to purchase innovative products. In contrast to existing studies that primarily emphasize the advantages of PPI, this paper takes a comprehensive approach,...

This chapter revisits the interaction between the EU rules on State aid and on public procurement. It probes the standard presumption that compliance with EU procurement rules excludes the existence of State aid because public tenders are apt to replicate market conditions and thus suppress any...

I study the determinants of dual sourcing and its effects on government procurement costs using a panel dataset of tactical missiles. American defense policy encourages the use of dual sourcing to reduce government procurement costs. Recent theoretical work is skeptical of this policy, but has...

A key issue in strategic management in the public sector is how government creates economic and social value through procurement. Unfortunately, most procurement studies are based on contract theories, which fail to incorporate the growing role of strategic management in performance. We fill...

We provide a general framework in which to determine the optimal penalty fee inducing the contractor to respect the contracted delivery date in public procurement contracts (PPCs). We do this by developing a real option model that enables us to investigate the contractor's value of investment...

This paper investigates the relevance of government purchasing behavior for innovation-based economic growth. We construct a parsimonious Schumpeterian growth model in which demand from the public sphere can effectively alter the economy's rate of technological change. We incorporate results of...

We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement mechanism is delegated to an agent of the buyer. The agent has private information about the buyer's preferences and may collude with one of the sellers. We provide a precise...

Discriminatory programs that favor local and small firms in government procurement are common in many countries. This paper studies the long-run impact of procurement discrimination on market structure and future competition in industries where learning-by-doing makes incumbent firms more...

This paper studies the interaction between financially constrained and financially strong firms on a procurement market. It characterizes and discusses a procurement agency's optimal response when faced with financially asymmetric firms. By considering a dynamic setting, both present and future...