This paper examines the effect of ownership structure on the market assessment of asset sales. Three types of ownership structures are identified: large block outside, inside, and widely held. Empirical results indicate that firms with large block outside shareholders experience significantly...

This paper puts together the pieces of the puzzle of the ongoing regulatory competition debate on corporate law in the US. At early stages of this process Delaware conquered the leader’s place replacing Jersey, and forever locked-in there through peculiar manners. The States take as granted...

This paper is an attempt to evaluate the application of Corporate Governance framework issue within Public domain. It is an attempt to quantify the compliance of Greek companies with international best practices

This paper presents a data point relevant to significant issues of policy concerning areas of law where small firms have either been granted exemption from regulations or not investigated for violations of laws that, on their face, apply to them. Whether small firms should be exempted is an...

This paper investigates firms’ decisions to resist individualized disclosure of top management compensation packages. We exploit the unique German setting, where recent legislation man-dates individualized disclosure of remuneration for members of the management board of listed corporations,...

We expect competitors to act as each other's foes. Yet some companies own equity stakes in their competitors. The Article explores this phenomenon of companies owning about 5-15% of the competition and conjectures a few explanations for this investment strategy. The focus of the Article is on...

It is well known that recent decades have seen an explosion in levels of senior executive remuneration in public companies, both in absolute terms and in relative terms to ordinary worker pay. However, a conspicuous corresponding trend over recent years has been the development of a range of...

In this article, we analyze whether the manipulation of stock options still continues to this day. Our evidence shows that executives continue to employ a variety of manipulative devices to increase their compensation, including backdating, bullet-dodging, and spring- loading. Overall, we find...

This paper examines why powerful CEOs are paid more in total compensation. Broadly, our results are consistent with the managerial ability view. First, CEO power is endogenously determined reflecting the CEO's ability. Specifically, founder-CEOs are more powerful than professional- and heir-CEOs...

The Trust Indenture Act prohibits a binding vote of bondholders to change any core term-principal amount, interest rate, or maturity date-of a bond issue. In this Article, I show how the prohibition on a collective action clause inhibits a troubled company's ability to reorganize outside of...