Issuers of structured finance products can exploit the informational advantage over potential buyers via two ways. One way is to adopt lax screening standards, and simply pass off the risks to potential buyers. The other way is to make securities intentionally opaque and difficult to evaluate...

In this note, we analyze a sequentially rationalizable choice model with a transitive rationale and a standard preference. The model in this note is more restrictive than the Rational Shortlist Method (RSM) model which is proposed in Manzini and Mariotti (2007) to capture cyclic behavior. Yet, a...

Before purchase, a buyer of an experience good learns about the product's fit using various information sources, including some of which the seller may be unaware of. The buyer, however, can conclusively learn the fit only after purchasing and trying out the product. We show that the seller can...

We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which two senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about the qualities of their respective proposals, which are positively correlated. The information externality -- that the news disclosed by one sender...