We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches … matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions … typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in the …

the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching …

model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes of this principal …-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of …

Vulnerability to manipulation is a threat to successful matching market design. However, some manipulation is often …

model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes of this principal …-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of …

In this paper, I investigate matching problems where priorities and preferences are misaligned. In the case of … realization of their aptitudes (colleges' preferences) due to measurement errors. I show that in this case any matching mechanism …-sided centralized matching and two-sided decentralized early admissions. In the experiment, the Boston mechanism under pre …

We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchange, in which …