We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches … matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions … typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in the …

students often fail to grasp the strategic issues involved. The modified SDA algorithm significantly improves the matching for … admissions ; experiment ; quotas ; matching ; Gale-Shapley mechanism ; Boston mechanism …

model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes of this principal …-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of …

borrowers matching into groups exposed to similar economic shocks under JL, diminishing its effectiveness. I reconcile …

match the same incompatible pairs while matching the least number of compatible pairs. We extend the celebrated Gallai …

model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes of this principal …-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of …

Vulnerability to manipulation is a threat to successful matching market design. However, some manipulation is often …

model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes of this principal …-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of …