This paper addresses the legitimacy of competing interests involved in the enforcement of covenants not to compete (“noncompetes”). To date, the courts and legislatures have not relied on a principled theoretical framework to identify and assess the competing interests between firms and...

If capital won't come to fund managers, fund managers will go to capital. I document that fund managers move across mutual fund firms to manage amounts of capital that better match their skill, which improves the allocative efficiency of capital across fund managers. For causal identification, I...

Several empirical studies find that worker inflows from more productive or otherwise superior firms increase hiring firms' productivity. We conduct a similar analysis for Germany, using a unique linked employer-employee data set, and ranking sending and hiring establishments by their median...

We investigate whether and how social ties affect performance in teams by implementing a field experiment in which a sample of undergraduate students are randomly assigned to either teams composed by friends or teams composed by individuals not linked by friendship relationships. Students...

We investigate whether and how social ties affect performance in teams by implementing a field experiment in which a sample of undergraduate students are randomly assigned to either teams composed by friends or teams composed by individuals not linked by friendship relationships. Students...

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...

Employment relationships in the internet and technology sectors are highly dynamic with change and churn as the norm. Employees are now knowledge workers: highly educated, mobile, often with multiple cultural links, possibly exceeding other company assets in their comparable institutional value....