Lead jurisdiction models represent one option how to extend and enhance contemporary interagency cooperation among competition policy regimes. They constitute a multilateral, case-related form of cooperation that is suited to effectively create a one-stop-shop for the prosecution of...

Lead jurisdiction models represent one option how to extend and enhance contemporary interagency cooperation among competition policy regimes. They constitute a multilateral, case-related form of cooperation that is suited to effectively create a one-stop-shop for the prosecution of...

We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson's [American Economic Review 91, 2001] model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from international financial...

We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson's (American Economic Review 91, 2001) model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from international financial...

In an interconnected world, economic and political interests inevitably reach beyond national borders. Since policy choices generate external economic and political costs, foreign state and non-state actors have an interest in inflencing policy actions in other sovereign countries to their...

Economists have long argued over the political economy of tradable emission permits, especially the political pressure of lobby groups on international environmental agreements. However, little attention has been paid to the effects of cross-national lobbying on this market. Here, we examine how...

This paper studies how former interest groups’ employees turned politicians (who we label as lobbyist legislators) influence the voting behavior of their colleague legislators. Using the alphabetic allocation of seats in the European Parliament and detailed individual résumé information, we...

Lobbying activities are important to the promotion of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). I quantify the influence of lobbying on ratification probability of FTA by constructing a novel dataset containing all lobbying activities about FTAs in the United States. I setup a contest model of lobbying...

In an environment where international trade agreements must be enforced via promises of future cooperation, the presence of an import-competing lobby has important implications for optimal punishments, and therefore dispute resolution procedures. When lobbies work to disrupt trade agreements,...

We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson's [American Economic Review 91, 2001] model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from in-ternational financial...