Should political institutions concentrate power in more hands or a single hand? This paper provides microeconomic evidence on the relationship between multiple elected representatives and economic growth. We find that increasing the number of politicians governing an area leads to greater firm...

This paper studies the way multinational firms allocate resources across countries in response to uncertainty shocks. Consistent with a model of internal allocation, I find that multinationals withhold investment in a country with higher (policy) uncertainty, which financially-constrained firms...

Increased interdependencies across countries have led to calls for greater harmonization of regulations to prevent local shock from spilling over to other countries. Using the rulemaking process of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), this paper studies the process through which...

We develop a theory to show how external and internal corporate governance mechanisms affect innovation. We show that there is a U-shaped relation between innovation and external takeover pressure, which arises from the interaction between expected takeover premia and private benefits of...

Job rotation, where a principal routinely rotates agents among tasks, is argued to be a powerful antidote for agency problems inside an organization. However, when soft information dominates transactions inside a firm, verifying the information set that led to a particular decision becomes...