This paper analyzes tax competition when welfare maximizing jurisdictions levy source-based corporate taxes and multinational enterprises choose tax-efficient capital-to-debt ratios. Under separate accounting, multinationals shift debt from low-tax to high-tax countries. The Nash equilibrium of...

This paper models a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) as a coordination device. Multinational enterprises can invest in any number of countries. Without a multilateral investment agreement, expropriation triggers an investment stop by the single MNE. Under a multilateral agreement,...

The purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of the deepening presence of multinationals in emerging markets on the cost of macroeconomic volatility there. We find that macroeconomic volatility has a potentially large impact on employment and investment decisions of multinationals...

The purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of the deepening presence of multinationals in emerging markets on the cost of macroeconomic volatility there. We find that macroeconomic volatility has a potentially large impact on employment and investment decisions of multinationals...