We offer a multi-period systemic risk assessment framework with which to assess recent liquidity and capital regulatory requirement proposals in a holistic way. Following Morris and Shin (2009), we introduce funding liquidity risk as an endogenous outcome of the interaction between market...

We take a structural approach to assessing the empirical importance of shocks to the supply of bank-intermediated credit in affecting macroeconomic fluctuations. First, we develop a theoretical model to show how credit supply shocks can be transmitted into disruptions in the production economy....

When regulating banks based on their contribution to the overall risk of the banking system we have to consider that the risk of the banking system as well as each bank's risk contribution changes once bank equity capital gets reallocated. We define macroprudential capital requirements as the...

Surveys of bank efficiency intrinsically draw conclusions based on the assumption that all banks in a sample use the same production technology. Neglecting the existence of unobserved differences in technological regimes might distort efficiency estimates by assigning incorrectly these...

Due to the financial crisis, an increasing number of households face financial problems. This may lead to an increasing need for monitoring spending and budgets. We demonstrate that both cash and the debit card are perceived as helpful in this respect. We show that, on average, consumers...

Most existing credit default theories do not link causes directly to the effect of default and are unable to evaluate credit risk in a rapidly changing market environment, as experienced in the recent mortgage and credit market crisis. Causal theories of credit default are needed to understand...

Lending standards are a direct measure of credit conditions. We use the micro data merged from three separate sources to construct this measure and document that an uncertain macroeconomic outlook, rather than banks' balance sheet positions, was an important reason that a majority of banks...

Collateral is a widely used, but not well understood, debt-contracting feature. Two broad strands of theoretical literature explain collateral as arising from the existence of either ex ante private information or ex post incentive problems between borrowers and lenders. However, the extant...

Banks face two different kinds of moral hazard problems: asset substitution by shareholders (e.g., making risky, negative net present value loans) and managerial rent seeking (e.g., investing in inefficient “pet” projects and consuming perquisites that yield private benefits). The privately...

We analyze shareholders' incentives to change the leverage of a firm that has already borrowed substantially. As a result of debt overhang, shareholders have incentives to resist reductions in leverage that make the remaining debt safer. This resistance is present even without any government...