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order to keep funds flowing. In contrast, this paper finds that total (expected) manipulation across two rounds of short …-term financing may be either greater than or lower than manipulation with long-term financing. Manipulation in the two rounds may … either act as complements or substitutes, depending on whether one is looking forward or backward in time. Regulatory fraud …
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reduces its costs. Our model predicts that stronger reporting oversight leads to greater accounting conservatism, manipulation … to manipulate accounting reports. In our setting, ceteris paribus, conservative accounting is desirable because it allows … the manager to manipulate the accounting system to mislead the board and distort its decisions. Effective reporting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017144
reduces its costs. Our model predicts that stronger reporting oversight leads to greater accounting conservatism, manipulation … to manipulate accounting reports. In our setting, ceteris paribus, conservative accounting is desirable because it allows … the manager to manipulate the accounting system to mislead the board and distort its decisions. Effective reporting …
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parsimonious explanation for several empirical regularities documented in the literature on fraud …
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We develop an agency model in which managerial information manipulation creates pooling and entails ex-post costs … an external regulatory authority or RA (who investigates for fraud and levies penalties ex post). When the RA cannot pre …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012940701
This paper re-examines the size of penalties following securities class actions and the impact of lobbying on the time it takes to detect managerial misconduct. Managers of lobbying firms are able to get away with misconduct for longer and are marginally less likely to have to settle a class...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013003931