How do voting institutions affect incentives of committees to vote expressively? We model the problem of a committee, whose members have different depths of reasoning, that decides whether to approve an ethical proposal. Members who vote for the proposal receive expressive utility, but all...

A continuum of contestants are choosing whether to enter a competition. Each contestant has a type, and of those who enter, the ones with highest types receive prizes. A profit-maximising firm controls entry, and charges a price for it. I analyse how the mass and value of prizes determine...

When do groups and societies choose to be uninformed? We study a committee that needs to vote on a reform which will give every member a private state- dependent payoff. The committee can vote to learn the state at no cost. We show that the committee decides not to learn the state when...

A committee chooses whether to approve a proposal that some members may consider ethical. Members who vote for the proposal receive expressive utility, and all pay a cost if the proposal is accepted. Committee members have different depths of reasoning. The model predicts that features that...

Political agents often attempt to influence elections through "troll farms" that flood social media platforms with messages from fake accounts that emulate genuine information. We study the ability of troll farms to manipulate elections. We show that such disinformation tactics is more effective...

A committee divided into two factions is considering a costly project. Support of both factions is required for the project to be approved. As long as the decision is delayed, the committee can learn which faction benefits from the project. At the equilibrium, one of the factions effectively...