This note identifies profit shifting in response to cross-countrydifferences in corporate tax rates as a source of productivitymismeasurement. To quantify the magnitude of mismeasurement, theprofit-shifting effect is isolated from other possible effects ofcorporatetax rates changes on real...

Rent-sharing between firm owners and workers is a robust empirical finding. If workers bargain with firms, information on the actual surplus is essential. When the firm can use profit shifting to create private information on the surplus, it can thereby reduce its wage bill. We study how rent...

Rent-sharing between firm owners and workers is a robust empirical finding. If workers bargain with firms, information on the actual surplus is essential. When the firm can use profit shifting to create private information on the surplus, it can thereby reduce its wage bill. We study how rent...

We introduce wage bargaining and private information into a model of profit shifting and tax competition between a large and a small country. Shifting profits to the small country not only reduces a firms' tax bill but also creates private information on profitability, altering the wage...

We show that the fiscal authorities of high-tax countries can lack the incentives to combat profit shifting to tax havens. Instead, they have incentives to focus their enforcement efforts on relocating profits booked by multinationals in other high-tax countries, crowding out the enforcement on...