This paper studies strategic savings and free-riding behaviours among ex- ante vulnerable firms in a fixed debt network under linear and quadratic default punishment structures. We specifically pay attention to networks without ex-ante default feedbacks. Results show Nash equilibrium are unique,...

This paper studies bank competition with borrower adverse selection. In the model, expected non-performing loan costs are high when credit is granted in booms, when risk free rates are low, or when competition is strong. I prove that full competition is suboptimal due to this last effect; that...

This paper presents a model where bank credit depends upon borrowers' product market structure. We show that a larger number of competitors in the industry may increase credit availability by enhancing the resale value of the collateralized productive assets. We also study how this benefit of...

We formulate a Cournot-type market equilibrium model of simultaneous trading in the CDS and Loan CDS (LCDS) markets. We use novel formulations of two-market demand functions that include trading costs and margins. The equilibrium identifies a relation between premiums, elasticities and recovery...

This paper reviews recent research at the intersection of industrial organization and corporate finance on credit default swap (CDS) markets. These markets have been at the center of the financial crisis of 2007-09 and many aspects of their operation are not well understood. The paper covers...

This paper presents a model where bank credit depends upon borrowers ' product market structure. We show that a larger number of competitors in the industry may increase credit availability by enhancing the resale value of the collateralized productive assets. We also study how this benefi t of...

Brander and Lewis argue in a seminal paper (AER, 1986) that a firm's debt-equity ratio should have important strategic effects on product market competition. We test their model in a duopoly experiment under both, Bertrand and Cournot competition. We find that leverage has strategic effects, but...

This paper models an unexplored source of liquidity risk faced by large broker-dealers: collateral runs. By setting different contracting terms on repurchase agreements with cash borrowers and lenders, dealers can source funds for their own activities. Cash borrowers internalize the risk of...