We study how joint delegation of production and disclosure choices alters the incentives that firm owners offer to their managers. Our first set of results shows how the incentive weights that owners place on revenues are affected by firm characteristics and by whether their manager chooses ex...

This paper studies bank competition with borrower adverse selection. In the model, expected non-performing loan costs are high when credit is granted in booms, when risk free rates are low, or when competition is strong. I prove that full competition is suboptimal due to this last effect; that...

This paper presents a model where bank credit depends upon borrowers' product market structure. We show that a larger number of competitors in the industry may increase credit availability by enhancing the resale value of the collateralized productive assets. We also study how this benefit of...

Brander and Lewis argue in a seminal paper (AER, 1986) that a firm's debt-equity ratio should have important strategic effects on product market competition. We test their model in a duopoly experiment under both, Bertrand and Cournot competition. We find that leverage has strategic effects, but...

We formulate a Cournot-type market equilibrium model of simultaneous trading in the CDS and Loan CDS (LCDS) markets. We use novel formulations of two-market demand functions that include trading costs and margins. The equilibrium identifies a relation between premiums, elasticities and recovery...

This paper presents a model where bank credit depends upon borrowers ' product market structure. We show that a larger number of competitors in the industry may increase credit availability by enhancing the resale value of the collateralized productive assets. We also study how this benefi t of...

This paper reviews recent research at the intersection of industrial organization and corporate finance on credit default swap (CDS) markets. These markets have been at the center of the financial crisis of 2007-09 and many aspects of their operation are not well understood. The paper covers...

We develop a model of credit rating agencies (CRAs) based on reputation concerns. Ratings affect investors' choice and, thereby, also issuers' access to funding and default risk. We show that - in equilibrium - the informational content of credit ratings is inferior to that of CRAs' private...

Life insurers typically grant policyholders a surrender option. We demonstrate that the resulting lapse risk could materialise in the form of a "policyholder run" if interest rates were to increase sharply. An inverse stress test based on a unique set of regulatory panel data suggests that...