We develop a theory of optimal bank leverage in which the benefit of debt in inducing loan monitoring is balanced against the benefit of equity in attenuating risk-shifting. However, faced with socially-costly correlated bank failures, regulators bail out creditors. Anticipation of this...

We develop a theory of optimal bank leverage in which the benefit of debt in inducing loan monitoring is balanced against the benefit of equity in attenuating risk-shifting. However, faced with socially-costly correlated bank failures, regulators bail out creditors. Anticipation of this...

The structural approach views firm's equity as a call option on the value of its assets, which motivates stockholders to increase risk. However, since bank assets are risky debt claims, bank equity resembles a subordinated debt. Using this assumption, and considering the strategic interaction...

We investigate the effect of managerial incentives and market power on bank risk-taking for a sample of 212 large US bank holding companies over 1997-2004 (i.e. 1,534 observations). Bank managers have incentives to prefer less risk while bank shareholders have preference for ‘excessive' risk....

We show that provision of public liquidity has real consequences for firms. Comparing A-1 rated non-financial commercial paper issuers using Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) eligibility criteria, we show that firms with access to the CPFF were able to mitigate financing disruptions...

While it is recognized that the high degree of leverage used by financial institutions creates systemic risks and other negative externalities, many argue that equity financing is “expensive,” and that increased capital requirements will increase the cost of credit. Public subsidies of debt...

While the Basel II capital requirements allow considerable flexibility to banks in choosing models for estimating exposure at default (EAD), it is unclear how much these internal estimates could be impacted by the choice of modeling approach. In this paper, we implement several estimation...

This research investigates the real effects of public liquidity provision. Using the Commercial Paper Funding Facility's (CPFF) eligibility criteria for non-financial commercial paper issuers as the identification strategy, we show that firms with access to the CPFF were able to mitigate the...

We investigate the effects of managerial incentives and market power on bank risk-taking for a sample of 212 large U.S. bank holding companies over the period 1997-2004 (comprising 1,534 observations). Bank managers have incentives to prefer less risk, while bank shareholders prefer higher risk,...