This article applies the concepts of opportunity cost and utilitarian ethics to corporate bailouts. When one thinks about bailing out a failing or distressed industry it is also necessary to consider alternative uses for the funds. Opportunity cost analysis concludes that the funds used for...

A simple contracting environment with a creditor who has wealth and a entrepreneur who has a two-period investment project is studied. After observing the partial completion of the project at the end of first period, the creditor may decide whether to refinance it or liquidate it. Contracting is...

We provide evidence that large creditors exert a governing influence over corporate borrowers outside of covenant (technical) violation and payment default states. We show that, subsequent to syndicated loan origination, borrowers decrease capital inefficiencies, increase investments in...

With falling home prices and home foreclosures currently acknowledged as a severe problem in the U.S., more attention needs to be paid to the contributing phenomenon of residential developers undergoing liquidation, which has left behind a trail of partially-completed or abandoned properties. In...

We quantify the differences between market and regulatory assessments of bank portfolio risk, showing that larger differences significantly reduce corporate lending rates. Specifically, to entice borrowers, banks reduce spreads by approximately 4.1% following a one standard deviation increase in...

Theoretically, bank's loan monitoring activity hinges critically on its capitalisation. To proxy for monitoring intensity, we use changes in borrowers' investment following loan covenant violations, when creditors can intervene in the governance of the firm. Exploiting granular bank-firm...

We find that the number of independent directors on corporate boards increases by approximately 24% following financial covenant violations in credit agreements. Most of these new directors have links to creditors. Firms that appoint new directors after violations are more likely to issue new...

Poor corporate governance can damage the interests of shareholders, and may lead to company collapse. Previous studies in credit risk prediction provide no consensus as to which and how corporate governance variables determine bankruptcy. This paper is the first to apply a discrete time hazard...

Spanish savings banks (Cajas) and commercial banks have experienced very different destinies. Before the crisis both types of banks shared, almost equally, most of the financial Spanish market. Cajas were performing well. Nowadays, the soundest Cajas have been forced to transform themselves into...