Followers of law, politics and business commonly relate stories of individuals who appear to predict an expected self-performance level below what they believe likely. Candidates, attorneys and firms sometimes seem to under-predict their own capacities. Insofar as individuals typically construct...

We analyse incentive problems in team and partnership structures where the only available information to condition a contract on is some noisy ranking of the partners' efforts. This enables us to ensure both first best efficient effort levels for all partners and the redistribution of output...

The literature on staggered privatization sales suggests that governments can effectively signal commitment to not expropriate the future rents of privatized firms. The privatization of telephone firms around the world provides an excellent opportunity to test this theory. Using a sample of...

We focus on the coordination failure among domestic firms in the investment of expensive low-carbon technology, which helps reduce the amount of carbon usage and pollution. In this model the firms are charged with a carbon tax only if the total stock of carbon emission in the environment exceeds...

We scrutinize the use of value at risk as traders' limit in banks. Thereby, we compare a bank with uninformed traders dealing on a perfect capital market, with a bank in which traders receive a noisy signal about the future price of the stock they are dealing in. Additionally, they are able to...

We study information design in a regime change context. A continuum of agents choose independently whether to attack the current regime and will succeed if and only if the mass of attackers outweighs the regime's strength. The strength is uncertain, and the information designer chooses a...

This study uses a laboratory experiment to measure how voting behavior and policy outcomes change depending on whether individuals can compete for economic and political status. I find that competing for economic status decreases the intrinsic value placed on political participation, which in...

We develop a theory of information flows and political regime change, when citizens use information and communication technologies (ICTs) for both information acquisition and protest coordination. Governments can respond by obfuscation of citizens' signal or by restricting access to ICTs used...

Behavioral economics characterizes decision-makers using psychologically-informed models. Cognitive science produces psychologically-informed models. Why don't these disciplines talk more? Here, I present several arguments for why cognitive science should inform behavioral economics — it...

A ranking over a set of alternatives is an aggregation of experts' opinions (AEO) if it depends on the experts' assessments only. We study both those rankings that result from pooling Bayesian experts and those that result from pooling possibly non-Bayesian experts. In the non-Bayesian case, we...