We survey the academic literature that examines the risks and returns of private equity (PE) investments, optimal PE allocation, and compensation contracts for PE firms. The irregular nature and limited data of PE investments complicate the estimation and interpretation of standard risk and...

We develop a dynamic valuation model of private equity (PE) investments by solving the portfolio-choice problem for a risk-averse investor (LP), who invests in a PE fund, managed by a general partner (GP). Key features are illiquidity, leverage, GP value-adding skills (alpha), and compensation,...

We develop a dynamic valuation model of private equity (PE) investments by solving the portfolio-choice problem for a risk-averse investor (LP), who invests in a PE fund, managed by a general partner (GP). Key features are illiquidity, leverage, GP value-adding skills (alpha), and compensation,...

We develop a dynamic valuation model of private equity (PE) investments by solving the portfolio-choice problem for a risk-averse investor (LP), who invests in a PE fund, managed by a general partner (GP). Key features are illiquidity, leverage, GP value-adding skills (alpha), and compensation,...

We study the asset allocation problem of an institutional investor (LP) that invests in stocks, bonds, and private equity (PE). PE investments are risky, illiquid, and long-term. The LP repeatedly commits capital to PE funds, and this capital is gradually called and eventually distributed back...

We investigate whether the performance of Private Equity (PE) investments is sufficient to compensate investors (LPs) for risk, long-term illiquidity, management and incentive fees charged by the general partner (GP). We analyze the LP's portfolio-choice problem and find that management fees,...