The acquisition of information prior to sale gives rise to a hold-up situation quite naturally. Yet, while the bulk of the literature on the hold-up problem considers negotiations under symmetric information where cooperative short-cuts such as split the difference capture the outcome of...

Abstract This paper studies information-based manipulation in a setting where sophisticated investors have access to an independent source of information. It is shown that investors' access to independent information is crucial to support truthful announcements by the manipulator. However, even...

This paper considers the problem of information acquisition in an intermediated market, where the specialists have access to superior technology for acquiring information. These informational advantages of specialists relative to households lead to disagreement between the two groups, changing...

Informational advantages of specialists relative to households lead to disagreement between the two in an intermediated market. The additional information is, however, costly to the specialists, making it rational for specialists to limit the accuracy of the signals they observe. I show that...