In the era of Basel II a powerful tool for bankruptcy prognosis is vital for banks. The tool must be precise but also easily adaptable to the bank's objections regarding the relation of false acceptances (Type I error) and false rejections (Type II error). We explore the suitability of Smooth...

The study of firms' default has attracted wide interest among both practitioners and scholars. However, attention has often been limited to a relatively small set of financial variables. In this work, we try to increase the scope of analysis extending the investigation to other possible...

We analyze the voting behavior of a board of directors that has to approve (or reject) an investment proposal with uncertain return. We consider three types of directors: insiders, who are biased toward acceptance of the project, independent outsiders who want to maximize the firm's profit and...

This paper studies the hedging of price risk when payment dates are uncertain, a problem that frequently occurs in practice. It derives and establishes the variance minimizing dynamic hedging strategy, using forward contracts with different times to maturity. The resulting strategy fully hedges...

Fair value concept is widely used in DCF (Discounted Cash Flow) business valuation. One of the main principle of fair value concept is full information symmetry between contracting parties. The assumption enforces specific way of FCF (Free Cash Flow) estimation: all areas of inefficiency of...

This paper empirically investigates how organizational hierarchy affects the allocation of credit within a bank. Using an exogenous variation in organizational design, induced by a reorganization plan implemented in roughly 2,000 bank branches in India during 1999 - 2006, and employing a...

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the stochastic behavior of corporate debt ratios utilizing a balanced panel of 2,556 publicly traded US firms during the period 1997 - 2010. We partition the panel into ten economic sectors and perform panel unit root tests on each sector employing...

The paper provides a framework for analysis of remuneration to agents whose task is to make well-informed decisions on behalf of a principal, with managers in large corporations as the most prominent example. The principal and agent initially bargain over the pay scheme to the latter. The...

I build a model of optimal managerial compensation where managers each have a privately observed propensity to manipulate short-term stock prices. It is shown that this informational asymmetry reverses some of the conventional wisdom about the relationship between reliance on short-term pay and...

This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...