This study divides the audit market into the oligopolistic and atomistic segments at MSA level and examine whether the effect of audit market concentration on audit fees and audit quality is the same in these two segments. I find that the market concentration raises the audit fees in the...

We study regulation of the auditing profession in a model where audit quality is unobservable and enforcing regulation is costly. The optimal audit standard falls short of the first-best audit quality, and it is increasing in the riskiness of firms and in the amount of funding they seek. The...

Independence (in fact as well as in appearance) is widely thought to be necessary for the quality of audits, and audit quality is often equated with independence. Private incentives to demand (and supply) independent certification of financial statements are thought to be insufficient, thus the...

We study regulation of the auditing profession in a model where audit quality is unobservable and enforcing regulation is costly. The optimal audit standard falls short of the first-best audit quality, and it is increasing in the riskiness of firms and in the amount of funding they seek. The...

Two key assumptions underlying the regulation of U.S. financial reporting are the need to mandate the certification of financial statements, and to require that this certification be performed by independent auditors. Private incentives to demand (and supply) certification are thought to be...