anticompetitive effects tends to be larger, the larger is the increase in concentration caused by the merger. As market concentration … is more easily measured than the post-merger equilibrium (which is unobserved ex ante), the use of concentration screens …. That is, they do not inform how a change in concentration from a merger would affect prices. Courts and other policy …

pressure from binding capacity constraints, in addition to standard merger effects. We show that the pricing pressure terms … underlying ccGUPPI, calculated using pre-merger data, are sufficient to determine whether a merger of capacity-constrained firms … ccGUPPI is generally a useful proxy for actual price effects, with lower informational requirements than full merger …

We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger …-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to an … on the merger control institution and, in particular, whether it involves an efficiency defense. We derive the optimal …

their tendency to raise prices. Yet efficiencies are said to be rarely decisive in actual merger decision-making. Moreover …, the economic analysis of merger efficiencies lags far behind that of anticompetitive effects. This article addresses this … analytical gap, drawing attention to the merger specificity of both efficiencies and anticompetitive effects, the teachings of …