This study investigates the association between media uncertainty and a comprehensive set of corporate decision-making measures that capture firm, investment, and financial risk. We report evidence that CEOs and firms who attract greater media uncertainty are more risk-seeking. Media uncertainty...

Using text-based media content, this paper develops and empirically confirms a theory that explains how the media predicts takeover outcomes. It shows that positive media content about the acquirer predicts takeover success. Relative to other predictors proposed in the literature, the media...

We investigate the Dead Hand Proxy Put, a contractual innovation in corporate debt agreements that may impact hedge fund activism. We find the provision principally in loans, not bonds, and provide evidence linking adoption of the provision to hedge fund activism. Further, controlling for...

This paper studies the effect of stock liquidity on blockholder governance. Conditional upon acquiring a stake, liquidity reduces the likelihood that a blockholder governs through voice (intervention) – as shown by the greater propensity to file Schedule 13Gs (passive investment) than 13Ds...

Activists and journalists argue that allocation of greater control rights to shareholders mitigates the classic agency problem in corporations. I show that the effectiveness of such control rights depends on the cost of acquiring information on a firm. These rights have a positive effect on firm...

This methodological paper highlights the differences and the resulting implications from the application of the three most commonly applied weighting index methods to measuring corporate governance quality at an aggregate level: the Dichotomous; the partial compliance (PC) unweighted; and the...

The problem of managerial agency costs dominates debates in corporate law. Many leading scholars advocate reforms that would reduce agency costs by forcing firms to allocate more control to shareholders. Such proposals disregard the costs that shareholders avoid by delegating control to managers...

We study if a CEO's equity-based compensation affects the expected value generation in takeovers. When the objectives of management and shareholders are more aligned, as proxied by the use of equity-based compensation, more value-maximizing acquisitions are expected. Whereas in widely-held firms...

We study if a CEO's equity-based compensation affects the expected value generation in takeovers. When the objectives of management and shareholders are more aligned, as proxied by the use of equity-based compensation, more value-maximizing acquisitions are expected. Whereas in widely-held firms...