Several recent empirical papers assert that the decision to disclose an earnings forecast shortly before the actual earnings announcement reveals only short-term information and is therefore unlikely to entail proprietary costs. Using a simple dynamic model of voluntary disclosure, we show that...

Theory posits that investors can rationally infer the implications of strategic nondisclosure for firm value, pressuring managers to disclose information voluntarily. This study documents that the lack of an earnings guidance predicts an abnormal return of -41 basis points around the subsequent...

This paper documents a dual role for disclosure. In addition to the traditional role of alleviating information asymmetry, firms are motivated to disclose to attract limited investor resources and order flow away from other firms (Fishman and Hagerty, 1989). Higher competition for investors...

We examine whether features of bank executives' compensation contracts cause them to take actions that contribute to systemic risk. Using multiple return-based measures of systemic risk coupled with an identification strategy that exploits heteroskedasticity to account for endogenous matching of...

This paper estimates a dynamic model of clients' decisions to switch audit firm and misstate earnings as a function of auditor tenure. Adapting the conditional choice probability framework of Hotz and Miller (1993), which simplifies the estimation to a conditional logit, we find that dynamic...

Theory posits that investors can rationally infer the implications of strategic nondisclosure for firm value, pressuring managers to voluntarily disclose information. This study documents that the lack of an earnings guidance predicts an abnormal return of -41 basis points around the subsequent...

We examine two distinct channels through which going concern opinions can be associated with the likelihood of bankruptcy: auditors have better access to information about their clients' bankruptcy risk and going concern opinions directly induce bankruptcies. Using a bivariate probit model that...

Recent SEC regulations mandate that hedge fund advisers provide narrative disclosures of their business and operations. We find that 40% of these disclosures contain inconsistencies regarding advisers' regulatory histories, conflicts of interest (COIs), and risks. Inconsistencies are associated...

Employing a novel control function regression method that accounts for the endogenous matching of banks and executives, we find that equity portfolio vega, the sensitivity of executives' equity portfolio value to their firms' stock return volatility, leads to systemic risk that manifests during...