Life insurers massively sell savings contracts with surrender options which allow policyholders to withdraw a guaranteed amount before maturity. These options move toward the money when interest rates rise. Using data on German life insurers, we estimate that a 1 percentage point increase in...

Life insurers sell savings contracts with surrender options, allowing policyholders to prematurely withdraw guaranteed surrender values. Surrender options move toward the money when interest rates rise. Hence, higher interest rates raise surrender rates, as we document for the German life...

During the financial crisis, life insurers sold long-term policies at deep discounts relative to actuarial value. The average markup was as low as −19 percent for annuities and −57 percent for life insurance. This extraordinary pricing behavior was due to financial and product market...

We investigate whether financial contract terms alter individuals’ risk-taking behavior under a moral hazard framework. Exploiting (a) the contractual-level data of automobile insurance, and (b) a unique institutional reform that gives more pricing freedom to insurers, we discover a...

We study the effect of the life settlement market on the structure of long term contracts offered by the primary market for life insurance, as well as the effect on consumer welfare, using a dynamic model of life insurance with one sided commitment and bequest-driven lapsation. We show that the...

The paper highlights the life insurance risks such as mortality, lapses, and expenses. The paper explains these risks, discusses their measures and mitigation action. The paper also discusses the worse mortality experience due to COVID 19 during FY 2020-21 and FY 2021-22 assessed from...

We use data from a large US life expectancy provider to test for asymmetric information in the secondary life insurance-or life settlements-market. We compare realized lifetimes for a subsample of settled policies relative to all (settled and nonsettled) policies, and find a positive...

The employer-sponsored life insurance (ESLI) market is particularly susceptible to adverse selection due to community-rated premiums, guaranteed issue coverage, and the existence of a well-functioning individual market as a substitute. Using administrative payroll and healthcare claims data from...

The employer-sponsored life insurance (ESLI) market is particularly susceptible to adverse selection due to community-rated premiums, guaranteed issue coverage, and the existence of a well-functioning individual market as a substitute. Using administrative payroll and healthcare claims data from...

Adverse selection plays a prominent role in the insurance literature due to its negative implications for insurer financial performance and stability. However, there is a paucity of empirical evidence consistent with the existence of adverse selection in the U.S. insurance market. Potential...