How do firms modify CEO risk-incentive compensation in response to increased foreign competition? Theoretically we show the answer is ambiguous: increased competition can result in firms either increasing or decreasing the CEO's risk-taking incentives. Empirically using a quasi-natural...

This paper documents evidence that financial constraints increase firms' toxic emissions given that firms actively trade off abatement costs against potential legal liabilities. Exploring three quasi-natural experiments in which firms' financial resources are likely exogenously impacted, we find...

We explore theoretically and empirically the relationship between firm productivity and liquidity management in the presence of financial frictions. We build a dynamic investment model and show that, counter to basic economic intuition, more productive firms could demand less capital assets and...

We study firms' internal resource allocation using a dynamic principal-agent model with endogenous cash-flow volatility. The principal supplies the agent with resources for productive use, but the agent has private control over both project volatility and resource intensity and may misallocate...

This paper studies dynamic compensation and risk management under cash flow volatility shocks. The optimal contract depends critically on firms' ability to make good on promised future payments to managers. When volatility is low, firms with full commitment ability implement high pay-performance...