This paper studies banker remuneration in a competitive market for banker talent. I model, and then calibrate, the default risk of the banks generated by investments and remuneration pressures. Competing banks prefer to pay their banking staff in bonuses and not in fixed wages as risk sharing on...

We study price competition between firms over public list or posted prices when a fraction of consumers (termed ‘bargainers') can subsequently receive discounts with some probability. Such stochastic discounts are a feature of markets in which some consumers bargain explicitly and of markets...

We study the multiproduct monopoly profit maximisation problem for a seller who can commit to a dynamic pricing strategy. We show that if consumers' valuations are not strongly-ordered then optimality for the seller can require intertemporal price discrimination which can be implemented by a...

We study a firm with ethical employees who can adopt a profitable working practice that may harm their customers. Their response to this dilemma reflects their compensation contract as well as their ethical willpower. We identify optimal compensation contracts under utilitiarian and...

We introduce ethical agents into an analysis of decision making in a profit-maximising firm. Agents can adopt a profitable new practice that may harm customers. Their decision reflects moral considerations, organisational culture, and compensation contracts. We analyse both utilitarian and...

We study the impact of AI and cryptocurrencies on consumer surplus in banking, on the price of credit, and on the price of checking accounts. We solve a competition model of banking and credit which includes client naivety, heterogeneous client risk, and imperfect risk screening. These features,...

We study price competition between firms over public list or posted prices when a fraction of consumers (termed ‘bargainers') can subsequently receive discounts with some probability. Such stochastic discounts are a feature of markets in which some consumers bargain explicitly and of markets...