characterizes China's state sector. The model demonstrates the nature of the bargain between the principals (i.e., officials from … China's State Asset Council) and the agents (large-SOE managers). We derive an indifference payoff point, which maximizes … party in the game. This condition helps to explain the inability of China's political economy system to privatize …

In the hierarchy of China's state sector, both before and during the current reform period, government bureaucrats …

We provide a theory of how growth, corruption, and a low-powered public-sector pay scale coexist in a stable … equilibrium in the early stage of China's development. The regionally decentralized authoritarian regime of China features lower …-powered public-sector pay scale in China. We propose a principal-agent model, where the principal represents the Chinese people …

panel data set of CEO contracts from more than 300 state-owned enterprises in China, support most of the theoretical …

in exchange for favorable policy decisions? Using the corruption scandal involving the top Washington D.C. lobbyist Jack … significant decrease in market value following the guilty plea by Mr. Abramoff to bribery and corruption. A firm that spent $100 … event window around the passage of the anti-corruption law. We find that the negative association between lobbying and firm …