Extant theories suggest that managers may use hedging either to alleviate underinvestment problems caused by costly external financing or to promote overinvestment by circumventing the scrutiny of external capital markets. We empirically investigate this issue using a hand-collected dataset of...

Labor unemployment insurance reduces unemployment concerns. We argue that these benefitsmoderate incentives to smooth earnings to reduce employees' concerns about unemployment risk.Using exogenous variations in unemployment insurance benefits, we find evidence consistent withthis argument. We...

Managers have great discretion in determining management forecast characteristics, but little is known about how managerial incentives affect these characteristics. In this paper, we examine whether managers strategically choose the precision of their earnings forecasts for self-serving...

Managers have great discretion in determining forecast characteristics, but little is known about how managerial incentives affect these characteristics. This paper examines whether managers strategically choose forecast precision for self-serving purposes. Building on the prior finding that the...