I propose a centralized clearinghouse for college admissions in which students can signal enthusiasm by commitment, as … in early-decision programs. Furthermore, students can specify financial aid in their preferences and they can be matched …. To study centralized college admissions, I advance the theory of stability for many-to-many matching markets with …

particular, the set of dynamically stable matchings forms a lattice with respect to students' preferences but not with respect to …

. As a main motivation for these reforms the policymakers cited strategic flaws of the rules: students had strong … incentives to game the system, which caused dramatic consequences for non-strategic students. However, almost none of the new … manipulate. Simultaneously, the admission to each school became strategy-proof to a larger set of students, making the schools …

students to learn about universities and accepting a university that turns out to be inferior causes regret. We discuss and …

students to learn about universities and accepting a university that turns out to be inferior causes regret. We discuss and …

-qualified students subject to budget and capacity constraints. Student-proposing deferred acceptance is stable and strategy-proof for … students, but the set of stable allocations is large and the scope for manipulation by colleges is substantial, even in large … deferred acceptance, choosing another stable allocation would increase the number of admitted students by at least 3% …

mechanism that allows students to provide incomplete but expandable preference lists (EPLs). In contrast to the standard one …-shot (direct-revelation) or multirun (sequential-like) designs, the EPL mechanism matches students and colleges in a continuous … all students to the clearinghouse, whereas every student only needs to provide an incomplete initial preference list …

matching mechanism that is strategyproof for students. n the context of the German admissions problem, this mechanism weakly …